EU solidarity with Ukraine

Details zur Ausschreibung

Titel:
Cooperative Intelligent Transport System EU Root Certification Authority includi...
Öffentlicher Auftraggeber:
European Commission, Joint Research Centre - Ispra (JRC-IPR)
Datum der Veröffentlichung im TED:
19/04/2019
Frist für den Eingang von Angeboten:
07/08/2019
Status:
Geschlossen
Status
26/06/2019
28/06/2019
italiano (it) English (en)
Detaillierte Angaben zur Frage
Architecture
1. Please let us know if it is acceptable to use individual smartcards for root CA, internal EA, internal AA components if the keys are generated on a HSM (compliant with 'CEN EN 419221-2/3/5') and imported on smartcards compliant with 'CEN EN 419211-2/3'. 2. Regarding 3.1.3. 'C-ITS_TR_03 - Hardware and Software Layout';, please let us know if it is acceptable to use two firewalls in HA configuration for the Internal EA and Internal AA systems? 3. Regarding 3.1.2.3, 'b) There shall be no way, either direct or indirect, to access any other environment from C-ITS Production infrastructure'; and 3.1.2.4 'a) There shall be no way, either direct or indirect, to access any other environment from the disaster recovery environment during normal operation', please let us know if at least a secure connection for data sync between these Production environment and Disaster recovery environment is allowed in order to ensure data consistency, valid RTO and RPO for DR operations (revocation and issuance are critical operations for PKI), or only an off-line data sync (air gapped) is allowed. 4. Regarding 3.1.3. 'C-ITS_TR_03 - Hardware and Software Layout', point c), please let us know if it is mandatory to provide fail-over (physical) machines also for the Disaster recovery environment (DR EU Root CA, EA and AA servers and cryptographic modules).
28/06/2019
1. Individual smartcards can be acceptable if they fulfill the requirements in 6.1.5.1. 2. Yes. It is acceptable if the firewalls are configured to validate the requirements in 3.1.3. 3. An off-line data sync (air gapped) would be preferable because it would not require a network, which can represent a vulnerability. 4. The answer is yes, the text applies as described: “Enough (physical) fail-over machines SHALL be available in EACH environment or at least for the main EU root CA, EA and AA servers to cope with total hardware failure of the ordinary machines”.